Abstract: This paper shows how separately itemised surcharges potentially facilitate collusion during a temporary cost shock if firms commit to their duration. A duopoly model with price-matching punishments shows that if firms set higher prices they only receive punishment during the shock because they expect prices to fall in the future regardless of a deviation. When it is likely that costs will fall in the future, the price-matching punishment is too small to increase prices, so firms maintain rigid prices. When it is unlikely that costs will fall the punishment is harsh enough to sustain marginally higher supracompetitive prices. However, if firms commit to surcharges for the shock's duration they are able to set even higher prices, because surcharges effectively commit firms to a price decrease and so threaten a harsher punishment after the cost shock has ended.
Introduction
Separately itemised surcharges have become a common form of pricing for firms in industries that experience temporary cost shocks due to rises in the price of an essential input. Examples of surcharges are observed in the transport industries where many firms have implemented fuel surcharges since the recent unprecedented increases in oil prices; similarly, steel producers implement several different surcharges to cover the costs of fluctuating alloy prices. In many cases firms preannounce the level of their surcharge during its implementation and give some indication of the length of its duration. This paper considers whether 'surcharging' facilitates higher supracompetitive prices during a temporary cost shock.
The motivation of this paper comes from several cartel cases where firms have fixed surcharge levels during temporary cost shocks . The interesting question that this practice raises is: in the presence of low menu costs, why would firms illegally fix price increases and then precariously highlight the act by separately itemising the increase as a surcharge, which could increase the risk of alerting a competition authority? This paper argues that surcharges play a critical role in affecting the incentives of maintaining the collusive agreement.
It is well known that firms' incentives to maintain or break collusive agreements are affected by fluctuations in market conditions. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) find collusion is difficult to sustain when the market is in a boom, because firms' short-term gain from deviating is greatest while the expected loss in future profit is small. However, empirical studies by Carlton (1986 Carlton ( , 1989 suggest that prices in more concentrated industries, where collusion is more likely to occur, are less responsive to changes in the market conditions. This evidence leads Carlton (1989) to conjecture that colluding firms are unlikely to vary prices in response to cost changes due to the risk of triggering a price war. In a rare attempt to understand the problem, Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) show that tacitly colluding firms may prefer to set rigid prices if they have private information about their own costs. This paper develops another theoretical model which shows that colluding firms may maintain rigid prices throughout a cost shock. Price rigidity occurs in this model because firms enforce their collusive agreement by matching any price deviation in the future (as described by Lu and Wright, 2005) instead of reverting to the one-shot Nash price in the event of a deviation. In contrast to Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico's (2004) model where price rigidity exists because of firms' asymmetric information, firms may maintain rigid prices during a period of high costs in this model because of the uncertain future expectation of costs decreasing.
Setting and matching the same prices is widespread in the industries in which firms set surcharges, such as the airline and steel industry where firms are notorious price leaders (Scherer and Ross, 1990) . It is also not a new idea theoretically as it is the underlying principle behind firms' punishment strategy discussed by Chamberlin (1929) in the seminal paper on tacit collusion, and the static kinked demand curve (Sweezy, 1939) . Lu and Wright (2005) show price matching is a weaker punishment compared to Nash reversion and the even harsher optimal punishment strategies (Abreu 1986 (Abreu , 1988 , so firms may not be able to sustain the highest collusive prices in equilibrium, especially as firms' goods become more substitutable. However, price matching is attractive to firms because if there is a breakdown in the collusive agreement it provides higher profit during the punishment phase compared to the other punishment strategies.
The benchmark model with price-matching punishments is presented in section 3, which is extended in section 4 by introducing a cost shock with an uncertain end. This shows that firms find it difficult to set higher supracompetitive prices during a temporary cost shock due to the weakness of the punishment strategy. For instance, if higher prices are set, firms will adjust to the original price when costs fall regardless of a deviation, because the deviation price is higher than the original collusive price. Therefore, firms only expect to be punished throughout the cost shock. When it is likely that costs will fall in the future the price-matching punishment is too small to increase prices. However, due to the higher costs there is no incentive to deviate from the original price, and as a result firms maintain rigid prices throughout the cost shock. If it is unlikely that costs will fall in future periods, the punishment is harsh enough to increase prices, but these prices will be lower than the ones firms can set when it is certain costs will remain high forever.
Section 5 shows that surcharges can facilitate supracompetitive prices if firms credibly commit to when they will be removed, because they increase the punishment firms receive if there was a deviation. A surcharge effectively commits the firm to a price decrease when costs fall, and if firms deviate during the cost shock they are still committed to reducing the surcharge when costs fall. This further reduction in price means firms will receive an extra punishment after costs have fallen, which enables firms to set higher supracompetitive prices during the cost shock.
The price-matching punishment strategy is discussed in section 6 and section 7 concludes. But before presenting the model in more detail, section 2 provides a formal definition of surcharges and offers a discussion of some other potential explanations, which are not modelled by the theory and are out of the scope of the current paper.
Surcharges: Definition and Potential Other Motives
Firms disaggregate their prices in many situations, so to clarify which type of pricing falls into the realm of this paper the following definition is proposed: This paper is concerned with surcharges that firms commit to remove at some period in the future. Prominent examples of pre-commitment to surcharge duration can be found in the airline industry where various firms have preannounced certain oil prices which must occur before their surcharge is removed; buyers in the steel industry also know that suppliers adjust alloy surcharges monthly and new levels that become effective are announced a month in advance. Cartels can potentially create private incentives to enforce the commitment to surcharges.
At any given total price there is no difference in the revenue received by a firm that sets a single or dual component price. A surcharge also does not change the nature of the trade for consumers relative to setting a single component price because they are (usually) unavoidable. As such, they are distinct from avoidable 'add-ons' that a consumer can choose to buy from the firm to complement an original purchase (Ellison, 2005) . For instance, all consumers pay a fuel surcharge when purchasing a flight, but only some consumers will choose to buy the airline's travel insurance policy add-on, which could be obtained from an alternative supplier.
The usual explanation of why firms implement surcharges is to minimise menu costs from frequent changes to single component prices. Firms may construct surcharges to have significantly smaller menu costs which allow them to vary prices more often. Additionally, firms also claim surcharges increase the transparency of price changes and allow them to justify the extra burden of their costs to their buyers 3 . This may increase the acceptability of the price rise, as Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) suggest that consumers perceive price increases due to cost rises as 'fairer' than the equivalent price rise due to other factors. This may explain why surcharges are predominantly a cost shock phenomenon and why they are preannounced. For instance, in an experiment, Franciosi et al (1995) find firms that announce profits or costs after a cost shock are able to increase prices to the new equilibrium quicker than firms that make no announcement.
Nevertheless, firms may implement dual component prices to obfuscate their total price for consumers. This could be beneficial for firms for two reasons; firstly, an Air Transport Users Council (AUC) report (2005) suggests that airlines include surcharges in the taxes, fees and charges (TFCs) element of the price to fool consumers into booking online flights with a competitive advertised base fare which has unexpectedly uncompetitive TFCs. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that firms may shroud surcharges and add-ons from consumers to be able to set them at higher levels. Secondly, imperfect price transparency can increase the sustainability of supracompetitive prices. Møllegaard and Overgaard (2005) argue that reduced price transparency for consumers decreases the incentive for firms to deviate from a collusive agreement, because consumers will not be aware of the price reduction and so will not switch between firms.
Alternatively, surcharges may be used as a signal to a rival of a firm's intent of which price they will set, which may help firms to tacitly coordinate on the surcharge level and total price. Motta (2004) argues coordination is especially difficult in asymmetric oligopolies where firms have different preferences over a range of prices and as a result they may get stuck at a suboptimal price.
However, surcharges must provide some extra benefit to the cartels mentioned above since they explicitly fix price increases. As such, these cartels may have used surcharges to facilitate collusion. This hypothesis is considered in the remaining sections of this paper.
The Model with Price Matching Punishments
Consider a duopoly where firm 1 and 2 compete on price to sell differentiated goods. The inverse demand function of firm 2 1, i = is given by ) ( Firms' marginal costs are constant and equal to c . For notational purposes, if a variable is the same for both firms the subscripts are dropped.
As in standard linear models (see Vives, 2000) when prices are sufficiently close both firms will have positive demand. However, if prices differ enough the high price firm will receive no demand whereas the low price firm captures the entire market. Specifically, firm i's demand is:
In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms' prices are Under these assumptions Lu and Wright (2005) show that firms can set supracompetitive prices if the collusive price is sustainable by a single-period price deviation. This is the case if:
where firms discount future profits by 1 0 < < δ
. They show that if prices are sustainable by a single-period price deviation it defines a subgame perfect equilibrium because firms can do no better by employing any finite multiple-period and infinite price deviations. This key result is replicated in Appendix A of this paper.
Single Component Prices during a Cost Shock with an Uncertain End
To model the impact that a temporary cost shock may have in a market, assume in (the present) period 0 = t an essential input for both firms' products increases in price, which raises both firms' marginal costs equally such that
, where hats on all variables signify that there is high marginal costs; in
. Firms expect the input's price and their marginal costs to return to their original position at some period
, but are unsure when this will occur. It is common knowledge that in each period there is a probability of 1 0 < ≤ θ that the input's price and the firms' marginal costs will return to their original state 4 . The period in which firms' costs fall (period T ) is finite because the probability that the cost shock will be infinite tends to zero as the number of periods tends to infinity. Once marginal costs have fallen firms expect they will remain that way forever.
Also assume that if there has been no deviation in the past firms are able to coordinate upon the price that gives them the highest profit, given the behaviour of the other firm in each stage game. Therefore, before the cost shock firms set:
Proposition 1 shows that if it is unlikely that costs will fall in the future firms set higher prices, but they maintain rigid prices if it is likely that costs will fall in the future, as Carlton (1989) there is a smaller incentive to deviate compared to no cost shock. At the same prices, due to the higher marginal costs, the initial deviation profit is smaller and firms receive a harsher punishment during the cost shock; and they receive the same punishment when costs fall. Therefore, firms will never deviate from any However, if the probability that costs remain high each period is 8 . 0 = θ , firms are able to set their price higher, and in this case there is no price rigidity for all γ .
Nevertheless, firms are unable to set as high a price when there is uncertainty of costs falling in the future compared with when it is certain costs will remain high forever:
, which is the highest price firms can sustain through price matching punishments with constant marginal costs ĉ . Also notice that firms will always set 6 This is even the case if there is a known finite end to the cost shock several periods into the future, because there is still be a dominant strategy to deviate in the shock's last period, so through backwards induction firms will always want to deviate from Proposition 1 provides a different result to the common understanding of pricing over business cycles. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) suggest that if firms sustain collusion by reverting to the one-shot Nash price forever after a deviation, firms find it difficult to sustain collusion when costs are low (demand is high), because there is a greater incentive to deviate during a boom since deviation profits are greater but the expected Nash punishment after the boom remains constant 7
. Proposition 1 suggests that firms find it difficult to sustain collusion when costs are high, because firms have a greater incentive to deviate as the expected punishment in future periods is weaker.
Even if firms are able to commit to prices for the length of the cost shock they cannot set 
Dual Component Prices during a Cost Shock with an Uncertain End
To consider the ability of dual component prices to facilitate collusion during the cost shock, assume that in the same model described above firms are now able to implement a surcharge with a base price which sum to give the total price. For notational purposes, firm i sets
, where i P is the firm's total price and i p is the base price. ; but in period T all surcharge commitments expire, so firms firstly removed their surcharges and secondly set prices simultaneously.
Proposition 2 shows that surcharges change the incentives to maintain collusion by threatening a harsher punishment when costs fall, which enables firms to set higher supracompetitive prices during the cost shock. Figure 3 shows the effect surcharging has upon pricing during the cost shock.
Proposition 2 Firms are able to set
Using the same parameters as in figure 1, figure 3 shows that firms must set their base price slightly lower than c p to sustain the monopoly price during the cost shock. This allows firms to add more of the total price as a surcharge, which threatens a sufficiently harsh punishment so firms will not deviate from the monopoly price. consumers observe prices. In the second period firms would be able to set higher supracompetitive prices depending upon the surcharge level they set.
Higher supracompetitive prices can also be sustained if firms commit to surcharges for a length of time that is shorter than or equal to the cost shock.
In this case if a firm deviated the harsher punishment may begin before the cost shock has ended, which increases the expected discounted loss in profit further and allows lower surcharges to facilitate higher prices. But obviously higher supracompetitive prices cannot be sustained when the surcharges are removed, unless another is implemented. This shorter commitment may be especially beneficial to firms when they expect their costs to fluctuate in the future to allow them to adjust their price with changing costs.
Discussion of the Price Matching Punishment Strategy
Pre-game theory, there was a widespread belief that firms match rivals' prices during price wars. More recently there is some anecdotal evidence of this behaviour (Slade, 1990; and Levinstein, 1997) . Nevertheless, a limitation of this model could be that the results are dependent upon firms employing a price-matching punishment strategy. For example, in contrast to this paper's model, firms can sustain the monopoly price if they revert to the one-shot Nash price for a number of periods in the event of a deviation and are sufficiently patient.
However, price-matching is, in our view, a tenable alternative to Nash reversion. Loosely, we can consider a collusive agreement maintained by price matching as an industry where firms do not react aggressively during price wars, whereas Nash reversion describes as an industry where cooperation quickly degenerates to vigorous competition. In theory terms not enough is known about how tacitly colluding firms initially develop their punishment strategies, and in what situations they are likely to react weakly or aggressively to deviations. It may be the case that matching price during price wars becomes a focal point for firms that commonly set the same prices when adjusting price upwards 10 . Alternatively, firms may use price-matching as a 'rule of thumb' when they are uncertain of their rivals' marginal costs and oneshot Nash prices are difficult to calculate. However, firms clearly face a tradeoff between price-matching and Nash reversion: although threatening a harsh punishment can sustain higher prices, if collusion was susceptible to break downs firms may prefer weaker punishments to receive higher profit during the punishment phase. Future research should consider under what circumstances firms prefer to behave aggressively or weakly during price wars. This paper does not describe how firms developed their price matching punishment strategy, just that there is a situation where firms enforce their collusive agreement weakly.
In a world where firms employ weaker punishments, surcharges may facilitate collusion in contrast to Nash reversion for two reasons. First, firms set supracompetitive prices after a deviation to allow surcharges to threaten harsher punishments when costs fall. Second, independent of the market conditions, the punishment strategy is not harsh enough to sustain the monopoly level when firms discount the future. As such, surcharges could be redundant in markets where firms react aggressively when rivals break the collusive agreement.
Nevertheless, if firms behaved less aggressively in the past, threatening a harsher punishment during the cost shock is not a substitute to implementing surcharges, unless firms are willing to invest in their reputation to become more aggressive. For instance, if in the past, firms' price-matching punishment has evolved over repeated interaction; firms know that threatening a harsher punishment during a cost shock is simply cheap talk: if firm j were to set price at the monopoly level during the cost shock firm i will deviate, because firm j will match the price rather than reverting to the oneshot Nash price because its expected discounted profit is higher.
Cartels are a different matter as the firms could explicitly communicate to quickly enforce and coordinate on a new punishment strategy that may enable it to set prices at the monopoly level. However, surcharges may still be a less complex alternative when implementing a new punishment strategy is difficult, which may be the case when cartels are in their infancy 11 . Nevertheless, surcharging could be a more risky option as separately itemising the illegally fixed price increase could potentially increase the likelihood that a competition authority will investigate.
Conclusion
Implementing surcharges has become a common form of pricing for firms and cartels when they experience a marginal cost shock. There are a range of possibilities that may explain why firms prefer to set dual component prices, ranging from increasing transparency to obfuscation strategies. This paper has considered the potential anticompetitive effects of the practice when firms commit to their surcharge for a period of time.
A collusive duopoly model shows that firms find it difficult to set higher supracompetitive prices during a temporary exogenous cost shock if they set single component prices and follow price-matching punishments. If it is likely that costs will fall in the future, firms have an incentive to deviate from a price which is higher than the original collusive price, as prices are likely to fall in the future regardless of a deviation. As such, firms only receive punishment during the cost shock, so firms' expected future loss in profit from a price-11 It is interesting to note that firms in the alloy surcharge case (see Acerinox, supranote 1) and to-date BA have not been accused of forming a cartel before their cost shocks. Thus, the cost shock possibly made explicit communication more appealing as it enabled firms to firstly fix the level of the price increase and secondly determine the punishment strategy. Since the cartels were newly formed implementing surcharges may have been the easier option to maintain the higher prices compared with changing their punishment strategy.
matching punishment is smaller compared to when costs are likely to remain high. Therefore, firms are restricted in the level of price they can set.
However, if firms commit to surcharges they effectively commit to price decreases in the future. This threatens a harsher punishment when costs fall if firms were to deviate during the cost shock, because a price deviation only decreases the level of the price further when surcharges are removed. If the level of the surcharge is high enough, firms' future expected discounted loss from deviating will be great enough to allow firms to set higher supracompetitive prices during the cost shock.
Future work should further consider the likely nature of why firms implement surcharges. Ideally, this research will empirically test whether firms in an industry set higher prices with surcharges during a cost shock compared to when there are no surcharges implemented. However, it is unlikely that such a data set that provides a clean, simple, natural experiment will exist. As such, the author's ongoing work is examining the incidence of surcharges across different industries and observing whether the firms that use them also preannounce their surcharge levels and when they will be removed. This may provide an indication of whether firms use surcharges to facilitate collusion and, if so, how widespread the practice may be.
where the first term is the profit firm i receives from its initial deviation and the second term is the profit from firm j matching firm i's deviation price forever.
Maximising this profit function with respect to i p subject to , which from above is not profitable. Consequently, through backwards induction every period's deviation will not be profitable.
Now consider an infinite price deviation. Firm i's present discounted value of profit from setting a deviation in each period with firm j matching each deviation price is given by: Therefore, the highest price that is sustainable by a single-period price deviation is: .
